**Appendix A - The Corpse Market**

The costs were always translated from the anatomist to the medical students as a hike of the price to access a lecture. (Frank, 1976; Bailey, 2010)

The other factor to consider is the families of the dead and the common people in general, who were profoundly opposed to these activities (Bailey, 2010). Both anatomists and body-snatchers were despised by the public who saw them as unholy men decimating the sacred remains of their relatives. Riots would be organized

In a coasian framework, this is a negative externality of the corpse market. Ideally, there would be bargaining between the parties causing the externality and those negatively affected. (Coase, 1960) One problem arises with the quantification of the negative externality generated, since in early-nineteenth century british culture, "no matter what other indignities the labouring population suffered during their lives, what they apparently feared most was to be denied a proper funeral and to be buried 'like a dog'" (Knott, 1985).

Considering, more generally, the relatives of the dead) as another player, we can think that the relatives were demanding dead bodies, too, to get them a proper burial, while anatomists demanded bodies to be ultimately dissected. In Coase's Theorem, there must be clearly defined property rights and low transactions costs, both of which were hard to come around in early-nineteenth century Britain. The utility for the relatives is going to be highest when all their dead bodies are buried properly, while the most utility for the anatomists would be got if all dead bodies were made available for dissection. Most efficiently, enough bodies would be supplied to anatomists so as to carry out their necessary investigations and no more, but criminals and suicides didn’t produce enough bodies. It would have to come down to the preferences of relatives since it is plausible not all of them placed the same importance on burials and could accept a fairer price from anatomists.

The problem, ultimately, lay somewhere else. It was in the private university system, which we can think of as an inefficient institution, that existed during this period which had schools competing for alumni and did so by having the best dissection showings, for example.(Bailey, 2010; Kaufman, 2004; Ross and Ross, 1979) Therefore, it would be fair to say more bodies were being supplied than was strictly needed for the “advancement of science” since these were being used theatrically and in the hope of attracting new students (Richards). If schools weren’t needing to attract students by having the most corpses to sustain themselves (and, especially, their prestige) the demand for bodies would decrease and weighing the risks of bodysnatching against the profits would reduce the desecration of tombs.

However, after 1832, there was little that could be done since now the force of the state was behind the provision of bodies. In the previous allocation they could all join forces and attack schools and body-snatchers, while also defending each other in the courts, who were usually favourable to the relatives (Bailey, 2010). And also, according to Knott (1985), the anatomists didnt even get that much of an improvement in the number supplied to their schools after 1832 and prices went back to pre-regulation rates a few years after that (Ross and Ross, 1979). I conclude the situation pre-1832 was a second-best institutional allocation.